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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent# 
v. 
KENNETH JAMES MORRELL, Case No. 890031-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code 
Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f)("appeals from district court in 
criminal cases, except those involving a conviction of a first 
degree or capital felony"). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court deny Appellant's state and 
federal rights to confrontation and violate the hearsay rule in 
allowing Officer Wayment to present hearsay evidence? 
2. Did the trial court deny Appellant's state and 
federal rights to confrontation in blocking cross-examination of 
the State's key witness? 
3. Did the court err in allowing the prosecutor to 
introduce evidence concerning Appellant's failure to exculpate 
himself after his arrest, but prior to his receipt of Miranda 
warnings? 
4. Is a guilty plea a "conviction" that is properly 
admissible under Rule 609? 
5. Is robbery a crime of dishonesty, and therefore 
1 
admissible under Rule 609(a)(2)? 
6. Was the evidence of an unrelated robbery admitted in 
violation of rule 404? 
7. Was the evidence of an unrelated robbery admitted in 
violation of rule 403? 
8. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error? 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Pertinent statutory and constitutional provisions are 
set forth in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 2, 1988, Appellant was convicted by a jury 
of robbery, a second degree felony violation of Utah Code Ann. 
section 76-6-301 (R. 118). The trial court sentenced Appellant 
to serve one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison (R. 122). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Matthew Moor, a nineteen year old delivery man for 
Ambassador Pizza, testified that on September 4, 1988, at about 
five minutes to twelve at night, he was told to deliver pizza and 
condiments to 813 Genessee Street (T. 12-15). He indicated that 
this was to be the last delivery of the night, and that he saw 
Appellant standing on the corner a few houses away from where the 
1 Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-301 provides as follows: 
(1) Robbery is the unlawful and 
intentional taking of personal property in 
the possession of another from his person or 
immediate presence, against his will, 
accomplished by means of force or fear. 
(2) Robbery is a felony of the second 
degree. 
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pizza was to be delivered (T. 14-15). Mr. Moor indicated that he 
asked Appellant if they were on Genessee Street, and Appellant 
indicated that they were (T. 15-16). After Mr. Moor knocked on 
the door of the home where the pizza was to be delivered and got 
no response, he indicated that he and Appellant apparently 
discussed the possibility of Appellant buying the pizza from Mr. 
Moor (T. 16). 
Mr. Moor said that as he sat in his car and Appellant 
stood outside, Appellant began searching his pockets for five 
dollars with which to buy the pizza, and then grabbed Mr. Moor, 
held a knife to him, and told him he was being robbed (T. 18, 52-
53). Mr. Moor indicated that he could feel that Appellant had 
something pointed in his hand, that Mr. Moor could not tell 
whether it was "a knife or a gun or whatever", but that 
Appellant told him more than once that he had a knife (T. 19-20). 
Mr. Moor indicated that by mutual agreement, the pizza 
and drink were placed on the ground, and at Appellant's command, 
he gave Appellant the car keys and gave Appellant twenty-five or 
twenty-six dollars out of his right pants pocket (T. 20-21, 52-
53). He testified that Appellant asked Mr. Moor where his "bank" 
was (the bag containing money for the pizza company), and had Mr. 
Moor drive to a very dark place where Appellant searched Mr. 
Moor's car and found a five dollar bill (T. 22-24). 
On cross-examination, Mr. Moor also testified that 
Appellant gave all of the money back to Mr. Moor and had him 
count it (T. 46). After Mr. Moor told Appellant how much money 
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there was, Appellant told him that the sum was not emough (T. 
46). After viewing the transcript of his preliminary hearing 
testimony, Mr. Moor explained that he counted the money twice (T. 
49). 
Mr. Moor indicated that he then drove to a vacant house 
on 10th East and 4th South, four blocks away from Ambassador 
Pizza, telling Appellant that a girl living there might give Mr. 
Moor more money for Appellant (T. 25). Mr. Moor explained that 
he knew that his girlfriend had moved out of the house, but 
thought he might run from that house to Ambassador Pizza and get 
some assistance (T. 25). 
On cross-examination, Mr. Moor was able to recall some 
discussion between himself and Appellant about going to Mr. 
Moor's mother's house to get more money (T. 57). 
Mr. Moor indicated that Appellant was using his shirt 
to hide his face from Mr. Moor, and that Appellant asked Mr. Moor 
for his Ambassador Pizza shirt, but that Mr. Moor didn't want to 
give this to Appellant because he was afraid that Appellant would 
notice that Mr. Moor had his bank stuffed down his pants (T. 25-
26). The bank contained about eight hundred dollars, and there 
was also some money in Mr. Moor's left pants pocket, but he did 
not give any of this money to Appellant (T.25-26, 53). Mr. Moor 
stated that the reason he gave Appellant the money that he did 
was because Appellant said he would kill him, and Mr. Moor was 
extremely fearful (T. 24, 67). 
Mr. Moor indicated that Appellant then directed him to 
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drive to the avenues to find a vacant house from which they could 
rob a Domino's Pizza delivery person, and that they went to a 
pay phone on Eighth East and Second South, from which Appellant 
had Mr. Moor dial the number for Domino's (T. 26-28). Mr. Moor 
testified that after discovering that Domino's was closed, 
Appellant told Mr. Moor he was tired of playing games, and 
threatened to use the knife on Mr. Moor if he did not produce the 
amount of money Appellant wanted (T. 29). 
Mr. Moor then told Appellant that his friend, Ivan 
Ilov, had taken Mr. Moor's bank and might have some money, and 
they drove to Mr. Ilov's house at 1985 South 200 East (T. 30, 
57). Mr. Moor indicated that Appellant directed him to honk his 
horn and yell for Mr. Ilov (T. 30). Mr. Moor said that when Mr. 
Ilov came out of his house, while Appellant had the knife pressed 
to Mr. Moor's rib cage, Mr. Moor told Mr. Ilov that Appellant had 
a knife held to him and wanted money (T. 31, 59). Mr. Moor 
indicated that Mr. Ilov broke the window on the driver's side of 
the car, Mr. Moor grabbed Appellant's wrists and began wrestling 
with him, and that Appellant wrestled himself free and began 
running (T. 31-33). 
Mr. Moor testified that when he chased after Appellant, 
Mr. Moor had a weapon, and that Appellant hit Mr. Moor in the 
nose (T. 62). After Appellant hit Mr. Moor in the nose, Mr. Moor 
chased him further and caught him (T. 63). Mr. Ilov then caught 
up with them and hit Appellant a couple of times, after Mr. Moor 
had restrained Appellant completely (T. 64). A nearby cabdriver 
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called the police (T. 33-35). 
Mr. Moor testified that he had not met or seen 
Appellant prior to that evening on September 4, 1988 (T. 35-36). 
Mr. Moor testified that he is five feet eleven and a 
half inches tall, and weighs one hundred and fifty five pounds 
(T. 64). Appellant is five feet seven inches tall and weighs one 
hundred thirty-five pounds (T.2 40). 
Ivan Ilov, a thirty-six year old former employee of 
Ambassador Pizza testified that on September 4, 1983, at two 
o'clock in the morning, Mr. Moor was in Mr. Ilov's driveway, 
honking for him (T. 69-71). He indicated that when he first 
went outside, he thought they were playing a joke on him, but 
then thought that Appellant was stabbing Mr. Moor and broke the 
car window (T. 70-73). He indicated that when Appellant began 
running away, Mr. Ilov gave chase, but was slower than Appellant 
because he had a broken leg and no shoes on (T. 73-74). Mr. Ilov 
indicated that after Mr. Moor caught Appellant, Mr. Ilov held 
Appellant for forty minutes until the police arrived, and that 
before they arrived, Appellant threw the money on the ground and 
Mr. Moor retrieved it (T. 76). 
Mr. Ilov never heard Appellant say anything about a 
robbery or saw a weapon in Appellant's hands (T. 81). 
Officer Allred testified that when Appellant was 
searched by the police, they took a name tag, a five dollar bill, 
and a one dollar bill from Appellant's pockets (T.2 15-16). 
Appellant testified that on September 4, 1988, around 
6 
12:00, he was dropped off from work at his home address, 814 West 
800 South (the initial encounter between Appellant and Mr. Moor 
occurred at 813 West and 850 South (T.2 19)) (T.2 21-22). 
Appellant indicated that shortly after he was dropped off on the 
corner of 8th South and 8th West, he saw Mr. Moor's car and 
recognized both the car and Mr. Moor (T.2 22). Mr. Moor asked 
Appellant if they were on Gennessee street, and Appellant said 
yes (T.2 23). After Mr. Moor got back into his car, Appellant 
asked Mr. Moor if he remembered Appellant (T.2 23). Mr. Moor did 
not answer, but looked at Appellant with astonishment (T.2 24). 
When Mr. Moor repeated the question, Mr. Moor did not respond, 
but began pushing the pizza and drink out of the window of his 
car (T.2 25). Appellant got in Mr. Moor's car and began talking 
with him concerning a debt Mr. Moor owed Appellant (T.2 25). 
Appellant had met Mr. Moor twice at parties, and at the second 
party had given Mr. Moor some marijuana with the understanding 
that Mr. Moor would pay him $45 for it later (T.2 25-26). 
Appellant indicated that Mr. Moor acknowledged the 
debt, and that after Appellant demanded payment, Mr. Moor pulled 
some money out of his pocket and gave it to Appellant, who gave 
it back to Mr. Moor, asking him to count it (T.2 27). After they 
determined that there were twenty one dollars, Appellant demanded 
full payment, and they discussed getting it from Mr. Moor's 
mother's house, and eventually went to Mr. Moor's girlfriend's 
house to get the money (T.2 28). When no one answered at that 
house, Mr. Moor then suggested that they go to his friend's 
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house, and they drove to Ivan's (T.2 31). Mr. Moor yelled to 
Ivan, who came out of the house (T.2 33). After Mr. Moor told 
Ivan he needed some money with which to repay Appellant, Ivan 
asked Appellant who he was and Appellant told him that it didn't 
matter, and that Mr. Moor owed him some money (T.2 33). 
Ivan then broke the window, Mr. Moor began wrestling 
with Appellant, who struggled free and began running (T.2 34). 
Mr. Moor swung at Appellant, and Appellant hit him in the nose, 
and eventually Mr. Moor and Mr. Ilov restrained Appellant, and 
Mr. Ilov struck Appellant's head on the ground repeatedly and 
kicked and hit him (T.2 35-36). 
Appellant testified that he was never armed with a 
knife and that the name tag in his pocket was the one he wore at 
work, and that he never used it as a weapon against Mr. Moor (T.2 
39). Appellant grabbed Mr. Moor only once, during their initial 
encounter when Mr. Moor began pushing the pizza out of the window 
toward Appellant (T.2 40). Appellant never offered to buy the 
pizza or threatened to stab or kill Mr. Moor (T.2 41, 50). After 
Mr. Moor counted the money ($21), he never gave it back to 
Appellant, who would not accept less than the full amount due 
(T.2 41). Appellant did not rob Mr. Moor, but was attempting to 
collect on a debt (T.2 53-54). 
Prior to Appellant's testimony, the State was allowed, 
over objection, to introduce evidence that when Appellant was 
arrested, he did not tell the police any exculpating information 
(T.2 13, 54-55). 
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Over objection, the State was allowed to present 
evidence of an unrelated robbery of a pizza delivery man, Paul 
Christensen, to which Appellant had pled guilty at the time of 
this trial (T.2 73-80). Mr. Christensen testified concerning the 
facts underlying the guilty plea. 
Over objection, the State was allowed to present the 
Officer Wayment's testimony that the telephones used to order the 
pizza involved in the robbery of Mr. Christensen and used to 
order the pizza involved in the encounter with Mr. Moor were not 
located at the addresses at which the pizzas were to be delivered 
(T.2 80-86). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In admitting the hearsay testimony of Officer Wayment 
concerning the statements of the telephone callers involved in 
this case and involved in an unrelated pizza delivery person 
robbery, the trial court violated the hearsay rule and 
Appellant's rights to confrontation. 
In blocking cross-examination of Mr. Moor concerning 
his drug and alcohol use, and their connection to his inability 
to recall a drug debt owed Appellant, the trial court violated 
Appellant's rights to confrontation. 
In admitting evidence of Appellant's silence during 
police questioning occurring after his arrest and prior to his 
receipt of Miranda warnings, the trial court erred. 
A guilty plea, for which no judgment and sentence have 
been entered, is not admissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 609 
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as a conviction. Robberies are not crimes of dishonesty 
automatically admissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2). 
Inasmuch as the trial court ruled to the contrary in admitting 
evidence of Appellant's guilty plea to robbery, the trial court 
violated Utah Rule of Evidence 609. 
In admitting evidence of the facts underlying the 
guilty plea, the trial court indicated that those facts were 
probative of intent and modus operandi. Because Appellant's 
intent during the encounter with Mr. Moor was neither in issue 
nor elucidated by reference to the facts underlying the guilty 
plea, and because "modus operandi" was neither relevant nor 
demonstrated by the facts underlying the guilty plea, the trial 
court violated Rule of Evidence 404. 
The facts underlying the guilty plea were designed to 
lead the jury to infer that Appellant was guilty of the robbery 
charged in this case because he was predisposed to do so, as 
evidenced by the facts underlying his guilty plea to robbery. 
Because this evidence had no legitimate probative value and was 
prejudicial, the court violated Utah Rule of Evidence 403 in 
admitting it. 
The trial court's errors were prejudicial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S 
RIGHTS TO CONFRONTATION. 
In Kentucky v. Stincer, 428 U.S. 730 (1987), the United 
States Supreme Court explained the two ways in which the 
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Confrontation Clause, which is designed to "insure the 
reliability in the truth-finding functions of a criminal trial", 
is violated: 
In the first category of cases, the 
Confrontation Clause is violated when 
"hearsay evidence [is] admitted as 
substantive evidence against the 
defendan[t]," with no opportunity to cross-
examine the hearsay declarant at trial, or 
when an out-of-court statement of an 
unavailable witness does not bear adequate 
indications of trustworthiness.... 
The second category involves cases in 
which the opportunity for cross-examination 
has been restricted by law or by a trial 
court ruling. 
Id. at 737-738 (citations omitted, brackets by the Court). 
The trial court in this case violated Appellant's 
2 
rights to confrontation in both ways - by allowing Detective 
Wayment to present unreliable hearsay evidence from witnesses who 
were never shown to be unavailable, and by blocking cross-
examination of the State's key witness, Mr. Moor. 
A. OFFICER WAYMENT'S TESTIMONY PRESENTED UNRELIABLE HEARSAY FROM 
WITNESSES WHO WERE NOT SHOWN TO BE UNAVAILABLE. 
As is discussed infra, the prosecution was allowed to 
present testimony concerning a robbery of a deliveryman from 
Ambassador Pizza, Mr. Christensen, to which robbery Appellant had 
entered a plea of guilty (T.2 55, 73-80). 
The State called Detective Wade Wayment, who testified 
2 In State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981), the Utah 
Supreme Court determined that the Utah Constitutional provision 
relating to confrontation, Article I section 12, would be 
construed in a manner paralleling the federal counterpart. Id. 
at 539. 
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over objection that the telephone used to call Ambassador Pizza 
on the night of the robbery of Mr. Christensen and the telephone 
used to call Free Wheeler Pizza on the night of the incident 
involving Mr. Moor were not located at the addresses where the 
pizzas were to be delivered (T.2 81-82, 84). Officer Wayment did 
not indicate the names of the people calling the pizza companies 
and leaving the telephone numbers, and did not indicate the names 
of the witnesses who recorded the telephone numbers. 
The trial court apparently admitted this evidence 
because it had been recorded in a police report in the normal 
course of business (T.2 83). 
1. OFFICER WAYMENT1S TESTIMONY VIOLATED THE HEARSAY RULE. 
Contrary to the trial court's assumption that 
information contained in police reports recorded during the 
normal course of business is reliable, the Utah Rules of Evidence 
indicate that such information is inadmissible hearsay. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay as "a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying 
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted." The telephone numbers presented through 
Officer Wayment constituted assertions that the persons calling 
Ambassador Pizza and Free Wheeler Pizza had actually called the 
pizza companies and left the specified telephone numbers and 
addresses, and were calling from specified telephones at 
specified locations. Neither the persons calling the pizza 
companies, nor the persons recording the telephone numbers at the 
12 
pizza companies were present in court. Thus, the evidence 
presented in court relating to the telephone numbers involved 
multiple layers of hearsay.3 
Utah Rule of Evidence 802 indicates that "[h]earsay is 
not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules." The 
only hearsay exception which might be applicable to a police 
report is Utah Rule of Evidence 803(8), which excepts the 
following from the proscription of the hearsay rule: 
[r]ecords, reports, statements, or data 
compilations, in any form, of public offices 
or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities 
of the office or agency, or (B) matters 
observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as 
to which matters there was a duty to report, 
excluding, however, in criminal cases matters 
observed by police officers and other law 
enforcement personnel, or Tel in civil 
actions and proceedings and against the 
Government in criminal cases, factual 
findings resulting from an investigation made 
pursuant to authority granted by law, unless 
the sources of information or other 
circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness. 
(Emphasis added). As demonstrated by the language emphasized 
above, Officer Wayment's quotation of the police report violated 
the hearsay rule. See also State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181 (Utah 
1983)(discussing the foundational requirements for admission 
under the business and public records exceptions, and explaining 
why hearsay contained in police reports is generally not 
admissible under these exceptions to the hearsay rule). 
3 See Utah Rule of Evidence 805, which provides: "Hearsay 
included within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if 
each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception 
to the hearsay rule provided in these rules." 
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2. OFFICER WAYMENT'S TESTIMONY VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO 
CONFRONTATION. 
In presenting hearsay testimony from the persons 
calling the pizza companies, as filtered through the employees of 
the pizza companies and Officer Wayment, the State completely 
failed to carry its burden under the Confrontation Clause, which 
the United States Supreme Court described in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 
U.S. 56 (1980): 
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not 
present for cross-examination at trial, the 
Confrontation Clause normally requires a 
showing that he is unavailable. Even then, 
his statement is admissible only if it bears 
adequate "indicia of reliability." 
Id. at 66. 
B. IN PROTECTING MR. MOOR FROM CROSS-EXAMINATION, THE TRIAL COURT 
VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO CONFRONTATION. 
During cross-examination, Mr. Moor testified that he 
had not met Appellant prior to September 4, 1988, and that he did 
not know a Scott Perry from West Jordan (T. 42-43). When asked 
by defense counsel if it were possible that Mr. Moor had met 
Appellant at a party near Trolley Square, Mr. Moor responded, 
"Well, there have been parties that I have been to where I don't 
remember anything. So, I don't know. I don't remember ever 
having seen Mr. Morrell, ever." (T. 43). 
When defense counsel inquired about the connection 
between Mr. Moor's poor memory and alcohol and drug use, the 
prosecutor objected, and the trial court sustained the objection 
(T. 43). The trial court also sustained an objection to a 
question concerning Mr. Moor's having bought marijuana from 
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Appellant, and stopped defense counsel from asking Mr* Moor if it 
were possible that he met Appellant at a party and didn't 
remember it for some reason (T. 44). 
During cross-examination of Appellant, the prosecutor 
was able to discuss the drug transaction freely, and emphasized 
the illegal nature of it. See T.2 46-48, 51 (appendix 1). 
The only facts in dispute in this case were subject to 
proof by two opposing witnesses - Appellant and Mr. Moor. In 
protecting Mr. Moor from questions which could have substantiated 
Appellant's version of these facts and undermined Mr. Moor's 
version of the facts, the trial court violated Appellant's rights 
to confront this crucial witness against him. Kentucky v. 
Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 738 (1987), supra. 
II. 
IN ALLOWING THE PROSECUTOR TO ELICIT 
EVIDENCE OF APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO EXCULPATE 
HIMSELF AFTER HE WAS ARRESTED BUT PRIOR TO HIS 
RECEIPT OF MIRANDA WARNINGS, THE COURT ERRED. 
Appellant called Officer Susan Neeley, who testified 
about Appellant's arrest, indicating that when the officers 
searched his body, they took nothing from him (T.2 3). During 
cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Officer Neeley if during 
the time that Appellant was restrained and after he had been 
patted down, but prior to his "arrest", he had made any comments 
to her (T.2 5). Defense counsel objected and a hearing was held 
outside the presence of the jury (T.2 5). 
The prosecutor indicated that he intended to show that 
Appellant did not exculpate himself by telling the officers that 
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he was collecting a debt, and argued that there was no 
infringement of Appellant's rights against self-incrimination 
because the prosecutor's question would be directed to the time 
frame prior to Appellant's official arrest (T.2 6-7). The 
prosecutor agreed with the trial court's assessment of the law, 
that "if, in fact, he had been detained and was held and knew he 
could not leave, that that would be tantamount at that point, 
subject to restraint as to require Miranda warning in regards to 
any statements that might be made", and Officer Neeley was then 
questioned outside the presence of the jury concerning the 
circumstances of the arrest (T.2 7). Officer Neeley was 
apparently present when the trial court and prosecutor discussed 
the applicable law (T.2 8). 
Officer Neeley indicated that she was called to 
investigate a fight and a "missing pizza driver", and that when 
she arrived at the scene of the arrest, Appellant was bent over a 
mailbox and Mr. Ilov was restraining him by holding his arms 
behind his back (T.2 8-9). She indicated that after Mr. Moor 
exited the Sconecutter restaurant, she and Officer Miller stood 
on opposite sides of Appellant, and "held him at that position" 
(T.2 9). Without giving any Miranda warning, Officer Miller then 
asked Appellant what was going on and he did not respond (T.2. 
9). During this conversation, Officer Miller was restraining 
Appellant by holding his arm behind his back, and Appellant was 
never free to leave (T.2 10-11). 
Officer Neeley indicated that from her perspective, 
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Appellant's detention constituted detention of a suspect when Mr. 
Moor exited the Sconecutter restaurant and told her what had 
happened (T.2 11). 
Apparently adopting the prosecutor's argument that 
Appellant's rights against self-incrimination did not attach 
until the police officers restraining him considered him a 
suspect in a crime, and apparently ignoring the fact that Officer 
Neeley's testimony indicated that she viewed Appellant as a 
suspect prior to Officer Miller's questioning of Appellant, the 
trial court allowed the prosecutor to introduce the evidence of 
Appellant's failure to exculpate himself (T.2 12). 
In front of the jury, Officer Neeley testified as 
follows: 
Q How long — Well, during the time that 
you were with Mr. Morrell at that point, did 
he make any statements to you about what had 
happened? 
A No. 
Q Was he asked what happened? 
A Yes, Officer Miller asked him what was 
going on. There was no response. 
(T.2 13). Defense counsel again established that as soon as the 
officers arrived on the scene, they took physical custody of 
Appellant from Mr. Ilov, and from that point on, "he was being 
held by the police" (T.2 13). 
When Appellant later testified, the prosecutor also 
asked Appellant if the police officers questioned him, and 
Appellant indicated that they did not (T.2 54-55). 
At the time Officer Miller asked Appellant what was 
going on, Appellant was physically restrained (Officer Miller was 
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holding his arms behind his back) (T.2 10-11), was the suspect of 
the alleged crime (T.2 11, 9), and was not free to go (T.2 10-
11). Under any test, Appellant was in custody when Officer 
Miller asked him what was going on, and was entitled to a Miranda 
warning. See generally Salt Lake City v. earner, 664 P.2d 1168, 
1170-1173 (Utah 1983)(majority opinion and concurring opinion of 
Justice Durham canvas the various tests applicable in determining 
when Miranda rights must be given). See also Utah Code Ann. 
section 77-7-1 ("An arrest is an actual restraint of the person 
arrested or submission to custody. The person shall not be 
subjected to any more restraint than is necessary for his arrest 
and detention.). 
In allowing the prosecution to discuss Appellant's 
failure to exculpate himself after he was arrested and prior to 
his receipt of Miranda warnings, the trial court violated 
Appellant's state and federal constitutional and statutory 
rights. Constitution of Utah, Article I sections 7 and 12; 
United States Constitution Amendments V and XIV; Utah Code Ann. 
section 78-24-9; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S 436 (1966). See 
also Matter of Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 
1988)(indicating that the State privilege against self-
incrimination may be interpreted more broadly than its federal 
counterpart); Untermyer v* State Tax Commission, 129 P.2d 881, 
885 (Utah 1942)(noting that federal due process precedents are 
"persuasive" in the interpretation of the State due process 
provision). 
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III. 
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED THE RULES OF 
EVIDENCE IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF A ROBBERY 
TO WHICH APPELLANT HAD PLED GUILTY, BUT 
FOR WHICH APPELLANT HAD NOT BEEN SENTENCED. 
Prior to trial, on November 29, 1988, Appellant 
submitted a motion in limine, seeking to exclude "any evidence of 
prior robberies alleged to have been committed by the defendant, 
on the grounds said prior acts are more prejudicial than 
probative, and do not meet the requirements Rule 404(b), Utah 
Rules of Evidence." (R. 85). Additionally, Appellant submitted 
a motion in limine, seeking to exclude evidence of a plea of 
guilty to a charge of robbery in another case, on the following 
grounds: 
1. Said plea has not yet resulted in judgment 
and conviction as the defendant has not yet 
been sentenced in that case. 
2. Evidence of said plea is more prejudicial 
than probative when considered in light of 
the standards of Rule 609(a)(1) and State v. 
Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986). 
(R. 87). 
The hearing on these motions occurred on November 30, 
4 
1988. Defense counsel indicated that the guilty plea mentioned 
in the second motion in limine had been entered before Judge 
4 The transcript of the hearing on the motion in limine 
appears in the second part of the volume of transcript marked 
"139", and will be referred to as (M.H.). The transcript marked 
"139" contains three parts: a hearing granting a continuance on 
the motion in limine hearing ("C.H."), the motion in limine 
hearing ("M.H."), and the sentencing hearing ("S.H."). The 
pagination of each of these three parts begins with the numeral 
1. 
The trial is recorded in two volumes, marked "137" and 
"138", which shall be referred to respectively as (T.) and (T.2). 
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Brian, and the sentence relating to that plea had not yet been 
imposed (M.H. 2). Defense counsel indicated that as part of the 
plea bargain before Judge Brian, the state had agreed not to file 
charges in any of several robberies in which Appellant was a 
suspect (M.H. 2). The prosecution apparently informed defense 
counsel that it intended to present evidence of the robbery 
involved in the plea before Judge Brian, and evidence of one of 
the robberies the State had agreed not to file on during the plea 
negotiations before Judge Brian (M.H. 2). 
The trial court found that for purposes of Utah Rule of 
Evidence 609, the robbery was a crime of dishonesty, and the 
guilty plea, for which no sentence had yet been imposed, was 
admissible as a conviction under the rule (M.H. 5, T. 92, 93). 
At the motion hearing, the trial court took under advisement the 
objections relating to proof of the facts of the robbery and 
Rules of Evidence 404 and 403, indicating the probability that 
the evidence of the robbery would be admitted (M.H. 29). 
After the State presented its case-in-chief, defense 
counsel again argued the inadmissibility of the evidence of the 
facts underlying the robbery that the State intended to admit in 
rebuttal to Appellant's anticipated testimony (T. 87-100). Again 
indicating its probable intent to admit the evidence, the court 
stated, 
From what I have heard here, I would 
allow it in. I may change my mind after the 
defendant testifies because I haven't heard 
any testimony yet. I only hear lawyer talk 
so far. But from what I have heard here, I 
would probably allow in that evidence as to 
20 
go to show intent and possibly modus 
operandi. 
(T. 100). 
During Appellant's cross-examination, the prosecutor 
asked Appellant if he had ever been convicted of a robbery, and 
Appellant admitted that he had pled guilty to a robbery (T.2 55). 
During redirect and recross examinations, Appellant indicated 
that he committed the robbery because he was addicted to cocaine 
and needed some, but indicated that prior to the incident 
involving Mr. Moor, Appellant had accepted responsibility for the 
unrelated robbery and entered a drug treatment program and was 
not using drugs at the time of the encounter with Mr. Moor (T.2 
56-66). 
In rebuttal, the State called Paul Thayne Christensen, 
and defense counsel objected (T.2 68-73). He testified that he 
used to be a delivery person for Free Wheeler Pizza, and that in 
June of 1988, Appellant had robbed him at gunpoint (T.2 74-75). 
He indicated that he was making a delivery about 1:00 a.m., and 
that Appellant came around the house where the pizza was to be 
delivered, asked how much the pizza was and searched for his 
wallet to pay for it, and then pulled out a gun and demanded 
money (T.2 76-77). The address of this robbery was between 13th 
and 15th South and Windsor Street (T.2 78). Mr. Christensen 
indicated that the robbery happened very quickly and that 
Appellant made no mention of recognizing Mr. Christensen from 
prior occasions (T.2 79). 
Appellant testified in surrebuttal that the robbery of 
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Mr. Christensen was the only one Appellant has committed, and 
indicated that the robbery charge pending in the instant case was 
not true (T.2 88). 
A. A GUILTY PLEA FOR WHICH NO SENTENCE HAS BEEN IMPOSED IS NOT A 
"CONVICTION" ADMISSIBLE UNDER RULE 609. 
The State argued that under Rule 609, for purposes of 
impeachment, a guilty plea is a conviction (M.H. 15-16). The 
trial court indicated some doubt about this assertion, indicating 
that there was no way for the court to know whether Judge Brian 
would arrest judgment, or sentence Appellant to a lesser offense 
(M.H. 15). The trial court later ruled that the guilty plea was 
a conviction for purposes of Rule 609 (T. 92). 
Rule 609 provides as follows: 
(a) For the purpose of attacking 
the credibility of a witness, evidence that 
he has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted if elicited from him or established 
by public record during cross-examination but 
only if the crime (1) was punishable by death 
or imprisonment in excess of one year under 
the law under which he was convicted, and the 
court determines that the probative value of 
admitting this evidence outweighs its 
prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) 
involved dishonesty or false statement, 
regardless of the punishment. 
(b) Evidence of a conviction under this 
rule is not admissible if a period of more 
than ten years has elapsed since the date of 
the conviction or of the release of the 
witness from the confinement imposed for 
that conviction, whichever is the later date, 
unless the court determines, in the interests 
of justice, that the probative value of the 
conviction supported by specific facts and 
circumstances substantially outweighs its 
prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a 
conviction more than ten years old as 
calculated herein, is not admissible unless 
the proponent gives to the adverse party 
22 
sufficient advance written notice of intent 
to use such evidence to provide the adverse 
party with a fair opportunity to contest the 
use of such evidence. 
(c) Evidence of a conviction is not 
admissible under this rule if (1) the 
conviction has been the subject of a pardon, 
annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or 
other equivalent procedure based on a finding 
of the rehabilitation of the person 
convicted, and that person has not been 
convicted of a subsequent crime which was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess 
of one year, or (2) the conviction has been 
the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other 
equivalent procedure based on a finding of 
innocence. 
(d) Evidence of juvenile adjudications 
is generally not admissible under this rule. 
The court may, however, in a criminal case 
allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of 
a witness other than the accused if 
conviction of the offense would be admissible 
to attack the credibility of an adult and the 
court is satisfied that admission in evidence 
is necessary for a fair determination of the 
issue of guilt or innocence. 
(e) The pendency of an appeal therefrom 
does not render evidence of a conviction 
inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an 
appeal is admissible. 
While it appears that the issue of the admissibility 
under this rule of a guilty plea for which no sentence has been 
imposed is a matter of first impression in Utah, analysis of 
the reasoning applied by the Idaho Supreme Court, working under a 
similar statutory sentencing scheme, demonstrates that such 
guilty pleas should not be admissible for impeachment purposes. 
In State v. Cliett, 534 P.2d 476 (Idaho 1975), the 
4 But see State v. Delashmutt, 676 P.2d 383 (Utah 
1983)(poorly reasoned per curiam opinion, finding a guilty plea 
admissible for impeachment purposes under Utah Code Ann. section 
78-24-9). 
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defendant was convicted of grand larceny of eighty six pigs. Id. 
at 477. When the prosecution called the defendant's ex-wife to 
testify against him, he attempted to present evidence that she 
had pled guilty to a felony - issuing checks without funds in the 
bank - but because her trial court had withheld sentencing her 
pending eighteen months of probation, the defendant was not 
allowed to impeach his ex-wife with evidence of her guilty plea. 
Id. at 478. 
In reviewing the propriety of excluding this 
impeachment evidence, the appellate court first noted that there 
is a split of authority on the issue of whether a guilty plea 
for which no judgment and sentence has been entered constitutes a 
conviction useful for impeachment evidence. Ld. at 478-479. The 
court explained that if a guilty plea were considered a 
"conviction" prior to the imposition of sentence, the 
ameliorative provision allowing for withholding of sentence 
pending probation would be undermined because the defendant would 
be stigmatized as a felon, ^d. at 480. The court concluded that 
the guilty plea was not useful for impeachment evidence because 
there was a possibility that the trial court would not adjudge 
the defendant's ex-wife guilty if she successfully completed the 
probation. Ld. at 479-480. 
In Utah, statutory guidelines concerning sentencing 
also contain a provision that ameliorates the penalties and 
burdens for the commission of crime. Utah Code Ann. section 76-
3-402 states: 
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(1) If the court, having regard to the 
nature and circumstances of the offense of 
which the defendant was found guilty and to 
the history and character of the defendant, 
concludes that it would be unduly harsh to 
record the conviction as being for that 
category of offense established by statute 
and to sentence the defendant to an 
alternative normally applicable to that 
offense, the court may, unless otherwise 
specifically provided by law, enter a 
judgment of conviction for the next lower 
category of offense and impose sentence 
accordingly. 
(2) Whenever a conviction is for a 
felony, the conviction shall be deemed to be 
a misdemeanor if: 
(a) The judge designates the 
sentence to be for a misdemeanor 
and the sentence imposed is within 
the limits provided by law for a 
misdemeanor; or 
(b) The imposition of the 
sentence is stayed and the 
defendant is placed on probation, 
whether committed to jail as a 
condition of probation or not, and 
he is thereafter discharged without 
violating his probation. 
(3) Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to preclude any person from 
obtaining or being granted an expungement of 
his record as provided by law. 
Previous Utah Cases have demonstrated a policy to 
interpret strictly the evidentiary requirements of proving a 
conviction, in order to facilitate ameliorative sentencing 
provisions. In State v. Jones, 581 P.2d 141 (Utah 1978), the 
court ruled that under former Rule of Evidence 21, a conviction 
for giving false information to the police, which had been 
expunged, is not admissible in evidence for impeachment purposes. 
The court explained: 
It is the prerogative of the legislature 
to prescribe what shall be the penalties and 
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burdens for the commission of crime, as well 
as for any amelioration thereof. It has 
provided that under certain circumstances 
convictions for crime may be expunged; and it 
further provides that when that is 
accomplished: 
Upon the entry of the order in 
those proceedings, the petitioner 
shall be deemed judicially pardoned 
and the petitioner may thereafter 
respond to any inquiries relating 
to convictions of crimes as though 
that conviction never occurred. 
The purpose of that^ statute is obvious 
and its intent is clearly stated: that even 
after a person is convicted of a crime, in 
appropriate circumstances he may comply with 
prescribed procedures which shall have the 
effect of a judicial pardon; and that 
thereafter he may respond to any inquiry 
concerning his record as though that 
conviction had never occurred. 
5 
Id. at 142. 
Further, a guilty plea may be withdrawn by the court 
prior to sentencing. See State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 1302-1306 
(Utah 1986)(discussing the circumstances in which a trial court 
5 Utah Code Ann. section 77-18-2(5)(b) currently provides 
that records subject to expungement may be opened by a court 
during sentencing proceedings: 
For judicial sentencing, a court may 
order any records sealed under this section 
to be opened and admitted into evidence. The 
records are confidential and are available 
for inspection only by the court, parties, 
counsel for the parties, and any other 
person who is authorized by the court to 
inspect them. At the end of the action or 
proceeding, the court shall order the records 
sealed again. 
There is no parallel provision indicating that convictions 
entered pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-402 may be 
considered elevated during sentencing for subsequent crimes. 
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may declare a misplea after accepting a guilty plea).5 
Because Judge Brian had not yet adjudged Appellant 
guilty of any offense or imposed a sentence relating to 
Appellant's guilty plea, the trial court erred in admitting 
evidence of Appellant's guilty plea for purposes of impeachment 
under Rule 609. 
B. ROBBERY IS NOT A CRIME OF DISHONESTY AUTOMATICALLY ADMISSIBLE 
UNDER UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 609(a)(2). 
During the hearing on Appellant's motions in limine# 
the trial court indicated its reliance on State v* Cintron, 680 
P.2d 33 (Utah 1984), and found that Appellant's guilty plea to 
robbery would be automatically admissible under Utah Rule of 
Evidence 609(a)(2) as a crime of dishonesty (M.H. 4-5). 
Numerous cases subsequent to the Cintron decision 
demonstrate that the trial court was in error in admitting the 
6 The Court in Kay was acting under Utah Code Ann. 
section 77-35-11(8), which provides as follows: 
(8)(a) The judge may not participate in plea 
discussions prior to any agreement being made 
by the prosecuting attorney. 
(b) When a tentative plea agreement has 
been reached that contemplates entry of a 
plea in the expectation that other charges 
will be dropped or dismissed the judge, upon 
request of the parties, may permit the 
disclosure to him of the tentative agreement 
and the reasons for it, in advance of the 
time for tender of the plea. The judge may 
then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and 
defense counsel whether he will approve the 
proposed disposition. 
(c) If the judge then decides that final 
disposition should not be in conformity with 
the plea agreement, he shall advise the 
defendant and then call upon the defendant to 
either affirm or withdraw his plea. 
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robbery guilty plea because it did not bear directly on 
Appellant's credibility. See State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 16-19 
(Utah Ct.App. 1988)("the crime of robbery is not necessarily one 
of dishonesty or false statement"); State v. Brown, 771 P.2d 
1093, 1094-1095 (Utah Ct.App* 1989)("theft is not necessarily a 
crime involving dishonesty or false statement"); State v. Lanier, 
778 P.2d 9, 10-11 (Utah 1989)(convictions for burglary and 
robbery were not admissible under 609(a)(2)); State v. Bruce, 779 
P.2d 646, 653-656 (Utah 1989)(retail theft and attempted burglary 
die not relate directly to credibility, were not admissible under 
609(a)(2)); State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217, 222 n.2 (Utah 
Ct.App.)(Jackson, J., dissenting)(noting the persuasiveness of 
federal cases limiting admission under 609(a)(2) to convictions 
that "bear directly on a witness's propensity not to tell the 
truth."), cert, denied 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
After finding erroneously that robbery is a crime of 
dishonesty, the trial court refused to consider the factors 
pertinent to admissibility under 609(a)(1) (M.H. 5). In 
admitting evidence of Appellant's guilty plea to robbery, the 
trial court violated Utah Rule of Evidence 609. 
Even if the robbery of Mr. Christensen involved 
dishonesty or were admissible under 609(a)(1), the manner of 
proof allowed under Rule 609 is limited to proof by public record 
or by the admission of the defendant. See also State v. 
Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387, 1390 (Utah 1977)(explaining the 
rationale behind the limitations on the manner of proof of 
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convictions, under the former rules of evidence). The facts 
underlying the robbery as described by the victim, Mr. 
Christensen, were inadmissible under Rule 609. 
C. IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF THE FACTS UNDERLYING THE ROBBERY 
GUILTY PLEA, THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 404. 
The prosecutor presented the testimony of Mr. 
Christensen relating to the facts underlying Appellant's robbery 
guilty plea under Rule 404, as evidence of Appellant's intent to 
rob Mr. Moor (M.H. 17-21). 
The trial court took the motion in limine under 
advisement, indicating that the court was inclined to admit the 
evidence as proof of intent, plan, preparation and modus operandi 
(T. 100; M.H. 29). 
Review of the statement of facts reveals that 
Appellant's intent was not the issue in conflict. Rather, it was 
Appellant's physical actions that were contested. While Mr. Moor 
testified that Appellant held a weapon against him, and told him 
he was being robbed (T. 12-68), Appellant testified that 
Appellant did not hold a weapon against Mr. Moor, did not 
tell Mr. Moor he was robbing him, but was collecting a debt, as 
acknowledged at that time by Mr. Moor (T.2 20-66). 
In these circumstances, the testimony of Mr. 
Christensen was not admitted to prove Appellant's intent. 
7 Compare State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 427 (Utah 
1989)(in trial involving aggravated sexual assault and aggravated 
burglary, evidence of defendant's lustful conduct with two women 
seven hours before the assault subject to trial was not relevant 
to intent involved in assault). 
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Rather, it was admitted to support the inference that Appellant 
robbed Mr. Moor because, as demonstrated by the robbery of Mr. 
Christensen, it was Appellant's nature to do so. Under Rule 404# 
this inference is not one the court could properly cillow the 
jurors to make; "Evidence of other crime, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show 
that he acted in conformity therewith." 
In admitting Mr. Christensen1s testimony as proof of 
plan, preparation, or modus operandi, the court fell into "the 
common error of equating acts and circumstances which are merely 
similar in nature with the more narrow common scheme or plan." 
State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989). 
The trial court's first error was in applying the modus 
operandi theory of admission in a case in which identity was not 
in dispute. As explained in Featherson, 
"As noted at the outset, this case presented 
no issue of identity. No rational argument 
would support a contention that the three 
sets of sex crimes were part of one larger 
plan. There being no issue of identity, it 
is immaterial whether the modus operandi of 
the charged crime was similar to that of the 
uncharged offenses. While the People rely on 
the 'common plan or scheme' rational for 
admissibility, under the circumstances that 
is merely a euphemism for 'disposition.'" 
Id. at 429, quoting People v. Tassell, 679 P.2d 1, 7-8 (Cal 
1984)(footnotes omitted by the Featherson court). 
Second, it should be noted that robbery of pizza 
delivery people is not unique. During the sentencing hearing, 
defense counsel argued that Appellant's sentence should run 
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concurrently with the sentence imposed by Judge Brian, stating as 
follows: 
I went through the police reports of the 
other outstanding pizza robberies, that the 
State at one time suspected Mr. Morrell of. 
The descriptions do not fit Mr. Morrell. 
They range from a body build like a walrus to 
a small hispanic, to white in color or from 
light colored hair to blonde to dark, 
straight. There are a number of outstanding 
pizza robberies, but there hasn't been 
identification of Mr. Morrell committed 
those. 
(S.H. 3). The State did not contest these assertions (S.H. 3). 
Compare State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 428-429 (Utah 
1989)(listing cases discussing similar crimes which do not prove 
modus operandi under Rule 404). 
Finally, there were numerous distinctions between 
Appellant's robbery of Mr. Christensen and his encounter with Mr. 
Moor. For example, with Mr. Christensen, Appellant called the 
pizza company and used a gun to rob Mr. Christensen of all 
available funds (T.2 88-89). With Mr. Moor, the only competent 
proof of how the encounter came about was that Appellant 
recognized Mr. Moor on the street, and used, either no weapon or 
a knife to collect a specified sum from Mr. Moor, pursuing 
collection of that specified sum to several locations (T. 12-68). 
The prosecutor in the instant case conceded that the facts 
underlying the crimes were not identical, "I don't think that 
[factual discrepancy between the crimes] is a big deal because, 
again, we are not talking about a signature crime or modus 
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operandi type approach.11 (M.H. 27). 
D. ADMISSION OF THIS EVIDENCE VIOLATED UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 403. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 provides as follows: 
Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
As demonstrated by subpoints A through C, the evidence 
relating to the robbery of Mr. Christensen had no legitimate 
probative value under the rules of evidence. Such evidence of 
unadjudicated crimes is presumed prejudicial. State v. Saunders, 
699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985). In admitting the evidence 
relating to the robbery of Mr. Christensen, the trial court 
violated Utah Rule of Evidence 403. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRORS REQUIRE REVERSAL. 
The trial court's two-fold violation of Appellant's 
right to confrontation is reversible unless proven harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204 
(Utah 1987). To find these Confrontation Clause violations to be 
harmless error, this Court must find that the verdict would have 
been the same, even if Appellant had succeeded in impeaching the 
witnesses that the trial court prevented him from confronting. 
See Delaware v. VanArsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 687-688 
8 Compare State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1161-1165 
(Utah 1980)(prior acts similar to those charged were admissible 
to show modus operandi). 
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(1985)(Marshall, dissenting). 
Inasmuch as this case involves two conflicting 
witnesses, Appellant's conviction apparently rests on the jury's 
decision to believe Mr. Moor. Had Appellant been allowed to 
corroborate his own version of the facts and undermine Mr. Moor's 
version of the facts by thorough cross-examination of Mr. Moor, 
it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the jurors would 
have convicted Appellant. Similarly, if Appellant had been able 
to impeach the witnesses quoted by Officer Wayment, relating to 
the fact that the encounter with Mr. Moor and the robbery of Mr. 
Christensen were initiated by calls from pay phones from 
addresses other than the addresses to which the pizzas were to be 
delivered, the State's improper efforts to prove Appellant's 
robber-like disposition would have been stymied. 
The trial court's permission of improper comment on 
Appellant's post-arrest silence must also be proved harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Bartley, Case No. 880375-CA, 
filed Dec. 20, 1989, slip opinion at 9. The credibility of the 
two opposing witnesses was the crux of this case. It cannot 
safely be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the jurors would 
have convicted Appellant if they had not been contaminated by 
the prosecutor's presentation of Appellant's failure to exculpate 
himself immediately upon arrest. 
The trial court's admission of irrelevant unadjudicated 
criminal conduct is presumed prejudicial. State v. Saunders, 699 
P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985). Inasmuch as the facts concerning Mr. 
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Christensen involved a robbery of a pizza delivery person 
occurring within months of the encounter with Mr. Moor, and 
inasmuch as the jurors were improperly instructed that the 
evidence relating to the robbery of Mr. Christensen could be used 
to impeach Mr. Moor's credibility and to show "proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident." (R. 98-99), the presumption of 
prejudice attached to this evidence cannot be rebutted. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Appellant's conviction and 
remand this case to the trial court for a new tria^. 
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APPENDIX I 
Valley. 
•v '"/here does he live now? 
A I am not sure. " hav<=* called his house hut his 
number has been disconnected. I haven't seen him tor a 
while. 
Q What number did you call? 
A I have it written down. I am not for sure. 
Q He did have a telephone? 
A Yes. he did. He lived on — What is it? Right 
by Pioneer Hospital. 
Q So, you had met Mr. Moor three times? 
A Twice. 
Q Twice, altogether? 
A Well, the third time was when he was in his car 
doing the pizza delivery. 
Q You are contending that Mr. Moor owed you 
money? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q He owed you money for what? 
A For some marijuana. 
Q Are you a pharmacist, Mr. Morreli? 
A No, I am not. 
Q Are you aware that the sale of mari.juana is 
illegal? 
A I wasn't selling. I know it is illegal for 
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possession, but I did not actually sell it to him. 
Q What do you call it if you give somebody 
marijuana and you expect to get $40 in return? 
A I told him he could pay me back later. I 
didn't want to use it anymore, okay? I had it on me. I 
had been smoking it. Scott asked me if I had any left. 
I said, "This is all I have got." He said, "You want to 
get rid of it? I have got a friend." 
Q And how much was it? 
A It was $45. 
Q What quantity of marijuana was involved? 
A I am not sure. I just told him to pay me 345. 
T said, "Is that okay?" And he said, "Yeah." 
Q You don't consider that to be the sale of 
marijuana? 
A I didn't sell it for a profit, no. 
0 What did you sell it for? 
A I did him a favor. 
G But in your mind there is no doubt you expected 
to-get money for it? 
A Yeah, he told me he would pay it back. I said, 
"That is fine. I know where you work." 
Q When did this transaction occur? 
A In July. 
Q You recall what date? 
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A Latter parr of July, around Pioneer hy, 
somewhere around there, around that week. 
Q What location did this parry occur "hat this 
transaction took place? 
A On the east side. Anywhere around 9th or 11th 
East, about: there. 
Q Somebody lived there? 
A It was at a house, yeah. 
Q How did you find out about it.? 
A Scott took me to the party. 
Q He knew where a party was and he took you 
there? 
A Yeah. 
Q You know who lived there? 
A No, I didn't know the people who was -brewing 
the party. 
Q You knew anybody there? 
A I knew Scott and I met Matthew once before and 
I knew him. It is not unusual to not knew anybody there. 
I don't go up on the east side. 
Q Did you make a telephone call to Ambassador 
Pizza in the morning hours of September 5th? 
A No, I did not. 
Q So, is it your testimony that it was * 
coincidence that upon your arrival at home, a person who 
owed you money and whose car you recognized, just 
happened to be driving by your house? 
A It happens like that sometimes, yes. What 
comes around goes around, I think. 
Q Are you sure that you were standing on the 
corner of Genessee and 3th West at the time that the car 
came by? 
A I am not positive. I know where I live, yes. 
Q You heard Mr. Moor testify he saw a person 
standing on the corner of Genessee and 8th West. Did you 
hear that testimony? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Is Mr. Moor lying? 
A No. I didn't say I wasn't standing on that 
corner. I said I seen his car go around the corner, make 
a left on 3th West and go up to the street. I walked 
over to the corner. It is only half a block away. 
Q Residence at 814 West 8th South, is there 
anybody else living there with you? 
A Yes. It is called "Dryer's Club." It is a 
house for people who are trying to stop drinking and get 
off of drugs. 
Q How long have you been living there? 
A Maybe a month, about a month and a half. About 
a month and a half. 
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Q Did you offer to buy the pizza that Matt had in 
his car? 
A No, I did note 
Q But you said that he shoved it at you in some 
way? 
A Yes. 
Q What happened when he shoved it at you? 
A Well, he tried to push it out of the window, 
trying to push me back. 
Q And what did you do? 
A I reached down and I grabbed him right hers and 
I said, "Hey, what are you trying to do, man?" 
Q What happened to the pizza? 
A The pizza was still sitting there pushed up 
against me. 
Q How did it get outside of the vehicle? 
A When I walked around to the side of the car, he 
let it go out of the car, I guess. 
Q He just dropped it in the street? 
A Yeah. 
Q You didn't, want to buy it? 
A No, I never asked to buy the pizza.-
Q It was kind of late and I guess he just wanted 
to get rid of it; is that right? 
A I have no idea. Maybe he was scared. Maybe he 
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found out somebody who he owed money wasn't, going to let 
him ^ e t o v ^ r ^ n him. 
Q You think that Matt Moor might have been 
A Well, I am sure he was. I guess. I never 
thought I would find him and get the money from him that 
he owed me. He knew I knew where he worked. 
Q How is it a man you met three times before in 
your life, is a good enough friend for you to sell 
marijuana? 
A Cause I have known Scott for about a year. I 
trust his judgment. 
Q And Scott said this guy is okay? 
A Yeah, he knew Matthew. I don't know7 how long, 
but he knew him. 
Q When Matt Moor, under oath, says to Ms. Ley 
that he doesn't knew anybody named Scott Perry, he is 
lying again, right? 
A Obviously. Scott knew him. 
Q Did you tell Matt how much money ycu wanted 
from him? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q How much did you tell him? 
A I told him 345. 
Q You didn't say to him at anytime, "I need at 
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